We research the properties of implicit transaction costs function for general-shaped limit order book. Equivalent conditions for linearity of the function are presented in terms of market liquidity. We also present a suitable functional form of implicit costs for order-driven market on the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), based on high-frequency trading data. The proposed form meets the definition of costs and implied properties while corresponding to the real form of order distribution.
Introduction
The development of modern concept of transaction costs has begun in the middle of the XX century [Coase, 1937] , [Marschak, 1950] ; for an overview of the history of the concept see [Klaes, 2000] . Transaction costs are commonly decomposed into implicit and explicit part [Keim and Madhavan, 1998 ]. Explicit costs are the direct costs of performing a deal on the market which include taxes and brokerage commission, usually a fixed fee per deal or a percent of deal volume, while percent might vary over time. Broker can also charge a percent of the deal value, i.e. costs are proportional to P · V , where P is the asset price calculated according to brokerage services agreement, V denotes deal's volume. In practice, commission formula can vary based on deal's volume or value. Implicit costs, on the other hand, depend solely on market microstructure and liquidity, and have drawn much attention since the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge-fund's severe losses followed by collapse, due to high transaction costs. The LTCM crisis threatened to create substantial losses for many Wall Street lenders thus triggering a chain reaction in numerous markets, which made the Federal Reserve Bank of New York organize a bailout of the fund [Jorion, 2000] .
Many key works on portfolio selection and management theory assume that transaction function is either fixed per deal or directly proportional to deal volume 3 . While these assumptions are justified for explicit costs in many cases [Keim and Madhavan, 1998 ], they must be justified or, better, proved for implicit costs. Otherwise, linearity can only be considered an approximation. Constant approximation, despite the simplicity, allows to introduce a fee per single deal and to regularize portfolio management problem by making strategies with high or infinite trade intensity (number of trades per unit of time) suboptimal. Linear approximation allows to incorporate explicit costs and impact of a deal size on implicit costs value. Absence of zero-degree linear term is a crucial assumption in many classical portfolio management frameworks, which allows to obtain closed-form analytic solution to the problem. Direct proportionality assumes missing or negligible fixed fee when compared to other costs. Works with non-linear parametrization include [Constantinides, 1979] , [Constantinides, 1986] for convex cost function; [Vath et al., 2007] which introduces pricedependent implicit costs C(V,P ) = V · I(V,P ) and permanent price impact I(V,P ) =P e λV .
The explicit form of impulse strategy for convex transaction costs, including fixed fee, is 3 See., for example, [Magill and Constantinides, 1976] , [Davis and Norman, 1990] , [Shreve and Soner, 1994] , [Framstad et al., 2001] , [Ø ksendal and Sulem, 2010] . obtained in 2007 in [Ma et al., 2013] . [Андреев et al., 2011] considers polynomial form of implicit costs with auto-regressive coefficients when solving the optimal liquidation problem.
We present results of theoretical and empirical research of implicit costs function in orderdriven market. For general-form distribution of limit orders in terms of cumulative volume as a function of depth, we introduce a definition of implicit costs and market liquidity. We show that linearity of implicit costs is equivalent to absolute market liquidity, while not identically zero only if agent's estimate of fair price differs from best quoted price. This draws to the conclusion that linearity of implicit costs does not match any real distribution of orders thus can lead to severe underestimation of losses due to large deals.
Based on empirical study of real distributions of orders at MICEX stock exchange for the period of 2006-2007, we introduce a parametric model of implicit costs which we believe to be more adequate to the data observed. We also demonstrate, for a specific management policy, how one can obtain an upper bound of deal volume, for which implicit costs can be approximated by a linear function.
Order-driven market
In order-driven (ODM) market, market maker's functions are delegated to automatic mechanism of order matching. We study a simplified model of the market which demonstrates its necessary aspects. At any time participants can place one of two types of orders: limit or market. Market orders trigger immediate trade (or sequence of trades) at available best prices while limit orders mean just the intent to trade at any price, up to the limit specified by the order. Definition 1. Market order is an order to perform immediate deal, which is characterized by volume v and direction ζ: ζ = 1 denotes buying, ζ = −1 denotes selling.
Definition 2. Limit order is specified by all the parameters of market order and limit execution price P . Limit order can be interpreted as an intent to trade volume V at a price not worse than P .
Each order also has identification number in the automatic matching system (time stamp). All participants have access to currently available set of limit orders sorted by limit price, also known as limit order book. At any point participants can perform the following actions: 1. Placement of a limit order. The order is added to the book and remains there until withdrawn by the owner, liquidated due to a deal or cancelled by the system at the end of trading period. Execution of a limit order can be partial; execution is performed immediately after an order of suitable price and opposite direction (market or limit) appears in the book.
2. Placement of a market order. The order is not added to the book but triggers its immediate change. Market order can lead to a sequence of deals with available limit orders of opposite direction, so that cumulative traded volume equals market order's.
In case of partial execution, the rest of market order is cancelled.
3. Cancellation of owned limit order. Removes the order from the book.
At the end of trading period, all unmatched limit orders are automatically cancelled by the system. Execution of orders is not random, it starts with best price orders, continues with second-best ones and so on. In case of several orders with the same limit price, execution starts in order of detection by the system: smaller time stamp means higher priority.
ODM market has the following characteristics related to costs research:
Best prices: at any moment t there are best bid and best offer price, P b,t and P a,t correspon-
Market price is a numeric characteristic of an asset reflecting its fair value. Market price might differ for buy and sell deals or differ from best prices. It can also coincide for both types. Market value of a deal is a product of deal volume and its market price. Note that market price is not directly observable on the market, though its estimates are often postulated as market price. It is participant's estimate of the asset's fair price thus subjective in nature. Participants might have different estimates of market price, thus different estimates of implicit costs (see below); however, heterogeneity does not deny equilibrium and semi-strong efficiency of the market [Kyle, 1985] , [Glosten and Milgrom, 1985] .
Trading volume for a specified price interval is a cumulative volume of available orders with limit price inside the interval.
Depth is a modulus of distance from best price. Each limit order has specific depth, while best orders have zero depth. Buy/Sell volume at depth D is cumulative trading volume of buy/sell limit orders with depth less or equal to D.
It is shown below that implicit costs do not depend on characteristics of specific orders inside the book, what really matters is distribution of trading volume as a function of depth for each book side. This leads to the study of ODM market and limit order book in terms of distribution functions. Academic works in this fields usually assume absolutely continuous distribution [Obizhaeva and Wang, 2013] , [Alfonsi et al., 2010] . Such distributions do not match any real order book; however, empirical distribution can sometimes be fitted by simple absolute continuous function [Bouchaud et al., 2002] . This leads to the definition of generalized ODM-market.
By has absolute liquidity level V at time t if
Absolute liquidity level V means that trades up to volume V can be performed with no implicit costs.
Definition 5. Buy (Sell) side of the limit order book in generalized ODM market
is absolutely liquid at time t if
Absolute liquidity means that trades of any volume can be performed with no implicit costs. Limit order book is absolutely liquid at time t when its sides are absolutely liquid at t.
Definition 6. Limit order book is absolutely liquid (has absolute liquidity level V ) during interval T ⊆ T if it is absolutely liquid (has absolute liquidity level V ) for each t ∈ T .
It is clear from the definitions that absolute liquidity is unachievable in a real market due to required infinite volume at best positions. This, in turn, requires infinite volume of one of the best orders, or infinite number of orders which is impossible in reality. However, rather active market can be considered absolutely liquid by the investor if maximum volume of her deals is expected to be smaller then cumulative volume of best orders. This is true for modern markets, where best volumes are so big that a single participant cannot match it with a single deal, and after execution of the triggered trade sequence, the book is instantly replenished (see example in [Biais et al., 1995] Definition 7. Price response function is denoted by
where inf{∅} = +∞. ρ(t, V ) is the value of jump of best price due to execution of market order of volume V at time t. V > 0 means buy, V < 0 means sell.
Market value of a deal of volume V can be expressed as
where P * a and P * b are market buy and offer prices at time t− correspondingly, with P * a,t ≤ P a,t , P * b,t ≥ P b,t . Real value of a deal can differ from market value and equals C r (t, V ).
Definition 8. Implicit transaction costs from a deal with volume V is denoted by
where
Definition 9. Explicit transaction costs C E (t, V ) from a deal with volume V is a sum of taxes and brokerage commission for performing the deal on the market.
We assume that for each t C E (t, V ) is non-negative, non-decreasing convex function of V .
Reason for postulating properties in the definition follows from economic interpretation and will be explained below. In this work, study of explicit costs is not performed because they are usually known to participants beforehand and rarely change. Besides, the shape of
is completely defined by brokerage services agreement and does not require modelling. The center of the research is implicit costs function because its shape depends solely on market microstructure and estimates of the participant; underestimation of implicit costs can lead to substantial unexpected losses on markets with low liquidity in case of sufficiently large deals.
Definition 10. Total transaction costs (also referred to as total costs or transaction costs)
Properties of transaction costs function on a generalized ODM market
Hereinafter, we consider only buy market orders and sell side of the book. But the results hold by analogy for the opposite side as well. We also omit the case of infinite costs and volumes. Consider total costs function
be the distribution function of volume. Denote C(t, V ; P a,t , P b,t ) = C(t, V ) henceforth for simplicity of notation. It follows from Definition 8 that
To simplify notation, dependence on t and P * b,t is henceforth omitted because only sell side snapshot is of interest.
Lemma 1. For any absolute continuous distributions
Proof.
1. For absolute continuous F − (D), F + (D) we have:
2. If ρ(V ) < +∞ then, by definition of response function, we have:
3. Substituting (6) into implicit costs definition, (4) and (5) yield:
for V ≥ 0,
for V < 0,
Transaction costs function must have the following properties according to its economic interpretation:
1. Cost of buying is not less than market value of the deal.
2. Deal of larger volume incurs larger costs. This property becomes obvious since deal with volume V 2 > V 1 can be decomposed into two consecutive deals with volumes V 1 and V 2 − V 1 , with implicit costs from both parts being non-negative due to property 1.
3. In generalized ODM market (R + , R + , T) infinitesimal increase of a deal volume incurs infinitesimal increase of costs, i. e. C(t, V ) is continuous in V .
Unit costs
are increasing in V . This follows from the automatic system's attempt to match limits order in order of limit price which leads to a gradual increase in costs per unit when worse orders are matched, thus increasing unit costs for the whole deal.
Consistency of introduced definition of implicit costs with aforementioned properties is proven in
4.
Proof. Hereinafter, the following statement is used ( [Revuz and Yor, 1999, proposal 4 .5]):
1) To prove the first statement, we use definition of ρ(V ), along with càdlàg and nondecreasing properties of F (D), to see that
2) The second statement is proven similarly. Denote ρ(
3) Continuity is derived form convexity of C(V ). For proof of convexity of implicit costs for general càdlàg distribution, see [Predoiu et al., 2011] . Here, we demonstrate the property for absolute continuous distribution with density q(p) > 0 where p ≥ P a , ρ ∈ C 1 , C I ∈ C 2 .
By definition,
Lemma 1 implies
Since C E (V ) is postulated convex, C(V ) is also convex.
4) Since the case of V
Corollary 1. Theorem 1 holds for C(V ; P * a ) for any P * a ≤ P a .
Proof. Since the statements hold for C(V ; P a ), then (2) implies 1) и 2) due to P * a ≤ P a ; 3) holds since C(V ; P * a ) is a sum of convex and linear function, hence, convex; 4) follows from
Note that properties in Theorem 1 follow from the definition for C I , while postulated for C E (see Definition 9), since study of explicit costs is out the scope of the work due to aforementioned reasons. However, explicit costs should satisfy the same properties due to economic sense.
Results below shed light on the possibility of popular shapes C(V ) ≡ const and C(V ) =
Theorem 2. For any distribution F (D), the following statements are equivalent:
2. sell side of the limit order book has absolute liquidity level V * .
Proof. According to definition, sell side with absolute liquidity level V * means F (0) ≥ V * .
2 ⇒ 1 is obtained directly from (7) since F (0−) = 0, ρ(V ) = 0 for all V < V * .
1 ⇒ 2 is proven by contradiction. Let F (0) = V 0 < V * . Consider two possible cases:
) = +∞ and C(V +V * 2 ) = +∞, which contradicts the main assumption sinceV
is non-decreasing thus cannot have a discontinuity at zero. Hence, C I (V ) > 0 which leads to contradiction.
Due to C I (0) = 0 it is sufficient to show that
. Indeed,
Hence,
, and we similarly obtain
In both cases we have
Definition of C I (V ) yields
Theorem 3. For any distribution F (D) the following statements are equivalent:
2. sell side of the limit order book has absolute liquidity level V * ;
Proof. 2 ⇔ 3 is proven in Theorem 2.
2 ⇒ 1 since 2 ⇒ 3, and constant is a special case of linear function.
1 ⇒ 2: continuity of C I (V ) and linearity for 0 ≤ V < V * yield linearity for 0 ≤ V ≤ V * .
Then Lemma 2 implies that F (D) cannot accept more than one value in (0, V * ]. Hence, there are two possible choices for F (D):
This behavior contradicts definition of F (D) since if sell side is not empty than at least one order is denoted the best, therefore, F (0) > 0. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3 implies that linear implicit costs model cannot be used if market price coincides with best quoted price. The only exception is zero implicit costs for absolutely liquid book side. Should market and best prices differ, linearity is possible:
Theorem 4. For any distribution F (D) the following statements are equivalent:
Proof. Proof is obvious from Theorem 3 applied to C I (V ; P a ), and formula (2).
sell side of the limit order book has absolute liquidity level V * .
Proof. Since C(V ; P * a ) = C E (V ) + C I (V ; P * a ), we use convexity and non-decreasing property of C E (V ), C I (V ; P * a ) to derive that linearity of C(V ; P * a ) is equivalent to linearity of both C E (V ) and C I (V ; P * a ) on the same interval. Thus, by virtue of Theorem 4, we derive the main statement.
Theorem 4 implies that linear approximation of implicit costs function C I (V ) does not match any càdlàg distribution function, hence, no real non-empty limit order book. In this regard, a more appropriate parametric form of C I (V ) is required to asses costs of large deals adequately. It is noteworthy that linear form might be appropriate if C I (V ) can be considered linear within allowed tolerance, for example, for small-volume deals. For more substantial deals that match in-depth limit orders, costs can be underestimated due to linearity. This fact has been noticed, for example, in [Андреев et al., 2011] for high-frequency MICEX data: polynomial interpolation C I (t, V ) = a(t)V 2 + b(t)V 3 was introduced since it contained a minimal set of parameters while providing acceptable fitting.
Transaction costs function on MICEX stock market
In this section, we introduce a parametric form of the implicit costs function based on empirical properties of MICEX data for the blue chip stocks of Lukoil (LKOH), Rostelecom fitting results, with precision decreasing for large depth values. This is systematic error which occurs due to the in-depth "inactive" limit orders orders which will be matched with very small probability but at great price for the seller. A participant places such orders to make use of a sudden market movement or an arrival of extremely large market order (for example, during restructures of large portfolios). Should considerable volume at better prices be matched, some part of the order might reach the "inactive area". We do not consider "inactive" area in this work, aiming for average-sized portfolio and assuming that market order's trades never reach such depth. Besides, placement of "inactive" orders is a rare event on MICEX which renders useless any statistical methods for estimation. To derive costs function in this case, denote distribution function of the sell side F (D) = V max F γ (D) where V max < +∞ is available sell volume on the market, and F γ (D) is gammadistribution function. Denote gamma-density
Lemma 1 yields
The study of cost function properties can be conducted through the properties of ρ(V ).
In view of (8), we can see that ρ (V ) > 0 is equivalent to q γ (ρ(V )) < 0, and ρ (V ) = 0 is equivalent to q γ (ρ(V )) = 0. Since
for all k ≤ 1 we have q < 0 for all D > 0, therefore, ρ(V ) is strictly monotonically increasing with no inflection points. For k > 1
Thus, ρ(V ) has exactly one inflection point. Therefore, polynomial approximation of ρ(V ) on MICEX is adequate to the data only for polynomials of third or higher degree, while (9) implies forth or higher degree polynomials for C I (V ). By virtue of (9), we obtain feasible parametric form of total cost function on MICEX stock market:
As shown in previous chapter, cost function can be considered both non-zero and linear only in the market with absolutely liquidity level greater than the market order's size. In practice, one can use linear approximation if underestimation of costs due to incorrect model is negligible. We illustrate this for MICEX market with cost function (10). Denote market price by P * a . Assume that investment strategy neglects implicit costs for volume V if they do not exceed αP * a V , 0 < α < 1, i. e. predefined fraction of the deal's market value. Denote by V * a non-zero solution of
Since F −1 γ (0; θ, k) = 0 and continuous, then there is V such that
Should the inequality hold for all V ≤ V max , non-linear part in (10) is negligible according to strategy's policy, and cost function can be considered linear. If the inequality is violated, there is V * > 0 minimal non-zero solution of (11). Therefore, costs function can be considered linear for the deal with volume V ≤ V * . For example, for θ = 4, k = 2, P * a = 1, V max = 100, 000, α = 0.02, we have V * ≈ 678 non-linear part of total costs value does not overcome 2% of market value for deals with this volume or less. Note that the result depends on the accuracy of estimates for θ and k.
Conclusion
The collapse of LTCM in 1998 and financial crisis of 2008 drew attention to the problem of liquidity risk in portfolio management, defined via transaction costs as a function of deal volume. Many contemporary works in optimal portfolio selection and management theory assume linearity of the cost function due to both the possibility of a closed-form solution in many theoretical frameworks and estimation of parameters by common econometric methods during practical use. While justified for explicit costs, for implicit part, which depends on market properties, the assumption needs verification or theoretical explanation. We show that linearity of costs is equivalent to the introduced form of absolute liquidity thus valid only for small deal volumes. Meanwhile, assumption of linearity for any volume does not match any real limit order book and can yield severe underestimation of liquidity risk. For MICEX stock market, we present a more adequate form of transaction costs function and provide an example of estimating an upper bound of deal's volume for which costs can be considered linear within tolerance.
